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Abstract 
When provided an opportunity for thought, individuals experience a strengthening of their 
already moderate attitude toward some attitude object.  This process was studied in the context of 
variables – attitudes toward behavior, norms about behavior, and perceived behavioral control – 
known to predict intentions to engage in health-related behavior. A potential moderator of this 
process – locus of control beliefs – was also investigated.  In this study, 195 participants 
indicated their attitudes toward eight health-related behaviors.  Participants were randomly 
assigned to either a high or low opportunity for thought during which time they were asked to 
focus their thoughts on the health behavior getting 8 hours of sleep a night.  Participants then 
responded to 18 items measuring Theory of Planned Behavior constructs and the 18-item 
Multidimensional Health Locus of Control scale.  Although self-generated attitude polarization 
was not observed in this study, evidence was found which supports previous Theory of Planned 
Behavior and Multidimensional Health Locus of Control research findings.  Study limitations 
and implications are discussed. 
Keywords: attitudes, attitude change, health locus of control, theory of planned behavior 
 
 
Individual Differences in Perceptions of Health-Related Behaviors 
 
Now more than ever we are bombarded with information reminding us how important 
our health is and why an active lifestyle is key to happiness.  Health maintenance is more 
available than ever with aerobics, yoga, strength training, and Pilates classes on television that 
start when we are ready.  There are video games in which we are coached toward improvement 
and motivational programs such as The Biggest Loser that show us it is possible for anyone to 
make a positive change regarding health.  There are more than 20 different exercise and health 
magazines from Shape and Self to Fitness Rx.  McDonald’s and other fast-food companies are 
required to provide nutritional information about their food while an increasing number of 
restaurants (e.g., Chile’s and Outback Steak House) offer more reasonably sized portions 
allowing one to remain within the specifics of many popular diet programs.  All of these 
examples serve to keep our own health and health maintenance salient. 
Making heath salient to people may do more than simply bombard them with daily 
reminders of something easily taken for granted until problems arise.  Each of these examples 
could be used to provide people with positive information about health to be stored for later 
processing.  It does not seem like a stretch to suggest that a majority of people would agree that 
behaviors such as running for 45 minutes three times a week, getting at least eight hours of sleep 
a night, and eating a low-fat diet are all favorable and beneficial to living a healthy life.  Yet of 
this majority, it is likely many would deny participating in all or even one of these behaviors 
despite generally favorable impressions of them.  What then might be done to strengthen these 
generally favorable attitudes toward behaviors that are beneficial to overall health?  Perhaps if 
we can strengthen people’s attitudes, we can in turn increase the likelihood of behavioral 
performance. 
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Self-Generated Attitude Change 
Abraham Tesser (1978) was first to posit the theory of self-generated attitude change, 
claiming individuals had the potential to strengthen moderate attitudes regarding some attitude 
object using thought alone.  With self-generated attitude change (i.e., self-persuasion), mere 
thought can effectively increase the extremity of a moderate attitude (for reviews, see Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993; Tesser, Martin, & Mendolia, 1995).  In other words, an individual’s initially 
favorable attitude toward exercising may become more favorable given a thought opportunity, 
whereas an individual’s initially unfavorable attitude toward exercising may become more 
unfavorable given a thought opportunity.  To recap, self-persuasion can occur for both initially 
favorable and initially unfavorable attitudes.  
Attitudes can be defined as a current evaluation resulting from all affective, cognitive, 
and behavioral information available regarding some attitude object (Albarracín & Vargas, 2010; 
Banaji & Heiphetz, 2010; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, 1998).  Let us assume an individual has a 
favorable attitude toward running.  Affective (i.e., emotional) components of this individual’s 
attitude may be discerned through frequent proclamations of a love for running or even how 
excited this person becomes when opportunities to run present themselves.  Cognitive 
components of this individual’s attitude would consist of thoughts, beliefs, and prior experiences 
regarding running: comfortable shoes, fast, 26.2 miles, and stress-reliever.  Behavioral 
components might be demonstrated by this individual’s training regimen to qualify for the 
Boston Marathon.  All salient information from these three components influence an individual’s 
attitude at any given time.  People can use this same information for self-persuasion.   
When we think about attitudes in a colloquial sense, we typically think in terms of 
emotions.  It should then come as no surprise that affect plays a strong role in the beliefs that 
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make up our attitudes (Frijda, Manstead, & Bem, 2000).  Our attitude toward some object, at 
least in part, results from the influence of these emotions on our beliefs (Boden & Berenbaum, 
2010).  Let us assume we ask a hypothetical participant’s opinion toward running for 45 minutes 
three times a week.  If all beliefs and past experiences salient to that person are positive, it would 
be safe to assume that person’s overall opinion toward running for 45 minutes three times a week 
would also be favorable.  When an opportunity for thought is presented, a confluence of these 
affective and cognitive components can lead to self-persuasion. 
When thinking about an attitude object (i.e., person, place, or concept), beliefs an 
individual has toward that object tend to align to be similar with that initial attitude (Chaiken & 
Yates, 1985; Eagly & Chaiken, 1998; Leone, 1984, 1996).  Thought about an object allows for 
beliefs to be analyzed and aligned with an initial attitude eventually leading to a change (i.e., 
increase in extremity) in that attitude.  As beliefs are analyzed during thought, beliefs consistent 
with the initial attitude accumulate causing a change in the affective evaluation of the attitude 
object.  This change in beliefs that eventually leads to an attitude change demonstrates the “big 
picture” (e.g., macroprocesses) of self-persuasion theory (Tesser et al., 1995).  To summarize, 
self-persuasion macroprocesses about an attitude object allows for a change in salient beliefs that 
facilitates an increase in attitude extremity.  In accordance with self-persuasion theory, how does 
thought cause this increase in beliefs preceding attitude change? 
Thought provides individuals an opportunity to generate new information, reinterpret 
equivocal information, or even remove incongruous information in order to facilitate an 
alignment of beliefs with an initial attitude (Chaiken & Yates, 1985; Clary, Tesser, & Downing, 
1978; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Sadler & Tesser, 1973; Tesser & Cowan, 1975).  Generation, 
reinterpretation, and removal of beliefs are microprocesses which facilitate a change in beliefs 
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that leads to an attitude change.  Assume we ask our hypothetical participant from earlier to think 
about running.  Initially our participant may think running is a good way to lose weight and 
might have a moderately favorable attitude about running.  While thinking about running, our 
participant may generate thoughts such as “losing weight means being healthier,” and “being 
healthy is better than being unhealthy.”  These newly generated beliefs, congruent with the initial 
attitude that running is favorable, should serve to strengthen (e.g., polarize) our participant’s 
attitude (Clarkson, Tormala, & Leone, 2011; Harton & Latane, 1997; Leone & Ensley, 1985).  
However, not all salient information may align with our attitudes.  Our hypothetical participant 
might recall that running can leave you feeling sore.  While this thought could be interpreted as 
muscles becoming stronger, it could also be interpreted as a decision to willingly harm one’s 
self.  One of these thoughts is positive and the other is negative.  According to self-generated 
attitude change theory, individuals with a favorable attitude toward running should use the 
former interpretation to bolster their attitude whereas those with an initially unfavorable attitude 
should use the latter.  Of course a third possibility is that those with favorable attitudes might 
discount altogether thoughts of running leaving them sore.  These microprocesses can either 
work alone or in combination to effect a change in one’s attitude (Tesser, 1978).  To sum, 
individuals will generate new beliefs, reinterpret ambiguous beliefs, and discount opposing 
beliefs to align beliefs with their initial attitude (Chaiken & Yates, 1985; Eagly & Chaiken, 
1998; Leone, 1984, 1996).  
Numerous studies have been conducted using self-persuasion for a myriad of attitude 
objects (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Tesser, 1978; Tesser et al. 1995).  Everything from football 
tackles (Tesser & Leone, 1977) to capital punishment (Chaiken & Yates, 1985) and has been 
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used to demonstrate the effects of mere thought on attitudes.  One of the most interesting studies 
using self-persuasion focused on phobias.   
Leone and Baldwin (1983) investigated self-persuasion for individuals with a strong fear 
of snakes to see if the presence or absence of a phobic object affected thought.  They suggested 
that the presence of a phobic object would inhibit individuals generating thoughts and beliefs 
originating from faulty reasoning thereby forcing accuracy when thinking about this object.  
Indeed, Leone and Baldwin found individuals provided with an opportunity to think while in the 
presence of a phobic object (i.e., a black nonpoisonous snake) showed increased approach 
behavior when asked to confront a phobic object a second time.  Conversely, individuals who 
either had an opportunity to think without a phobic object present or were not provided an 
opportunity to think about a phobic object showed little to no difference in approach behavior 
between both approach opportunities.   
Leone and Baldwin (1983) demonstrated applicability of self-persuasion to affect an 
attitude so rooted in emotion as to cause individuals to live in fear and avoidance of a phobic 
object for most of their lives.  If self-persuasion theory has implications for specific areas of 
mental health treatment (i.e., confrontation of phobic fears), perhaps it can also have applications 
for physical health and wellbeing.  Can individuals effectively create and strengthen specific 
beliefs regarding health-related behaviors?  Can specific references regarding health behaviors 
be made salient to participants while they think?  Could these attitude changes regarding health 
behaviors allow for increased behavioral performance?   
Theory of Planned Behavior 
One basis for predicting an individual’s behavior has been the Theory of Reasoned 
Action (Ajzen, 2012; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975).  Predictive accuracy of 
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a behavior is achieved through ascertaining an individual’s intention.  More simply, peoples’ 
behavior can be best predicted through understanding their intention to perform that behavior.  
The amount of time and effort an individual is willing to invest toward performing a behavior in 
addition to the motivation to perform that behavior is summarized by that individual’s intention 
(Ajzen, 1991).  According to the Theory of Reasoned Action, behavioral intention is the most 
proximal and significant predictor for behavioral performance (Cooke & French, 2008; Conner 
& Sparks, 2005; Langdridge, Sheeran, & Connolly, 2007).  
According to the Theory of Reasoned Action, an individual’s intention is comprised of 
two components: attitude and subjective norm (Ajzen, 1991).  An individual’s attitude, as 
explained above, consists of all salient beliefs (i.e., thoughts, feelings, and prior experiences) 
relating to an attitude object.  When an attitude object is a behavior, these beliefs often involve 
perceived consequences of performing or not performing that behavior (Conner & Sparks, 2005).  
Although numerous beliefs may exist for any given behavior, it is salient (i.e., readily recallable) 
beliefs that have greatest influence on one’s attitude toward a behavior (Conner & Sparks, 2005). 
This relationship between one’s attitude and behavioral beliefs is relatively robust (Armitage & 
Conner, 2001).  
Another important component that makes up an individual’s intention according to the 
Theory of Reasoned Action is subjective norm (Ajzen, 1991; 2006).  Subjective norm refers to 
an individual’s perception of beliefs important others might hold regarding a particular behavior.  
In other words, a subjective norm consists of a perceived probability that salient groups or 
individuals, whose opinions one deems important, will approve or disapprove of a particular 
behavior.  This perception could potentially influence one’s intention to perform a given 
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behavior (Johnston, White, & Norman, 2004; Manning, 2009).  Important others are generally 
perceived to approve of positive behaviors and disapprove of negative behaviors (Ajzen, 2006).  
To summarize, using the Theory of Reasoned Action, one can predict specific voluntary 
behavior by knowing an individual’s intention to perform that specific behavior.  This intention 
is comprised of an individual’s attitude toward a particular behavior in addition to the perception 
of how important others regard a behavior.  Positive attitudes lead to a greater intention to 
perform a behavior and negative attitudes lead to a reduced intention to perform a behavior.  
Likewise, a behavior that is perceived as positive by important others is more likely to be 
performed than a behavior that is perceived as negative by important others.  
Although it is useful to have a predictive measure of one’s voluntary behaviors, a number 
of behaviors one performs during any given day are not completely volitional (Ajzen, 1988).  
That is, some behaviors one engages in on a daily basis have obstacles and other variables that 
can impede or completely prohibit performance.  Regarding exercise, one might think this 
seemingly volitional behavior needs only conscious intention to remove one’s butt from the 
couch for performance.  However, there are other factors that must be considered.  Does one 
have necessary equipment (e.g., weights, treadmill, clothes) or available time not dedicated to 
other responsibilities (e.g., school, work, family) to spend exercising?  Because numerous 
behaviors are not completely volitional, the Theory of Reasoned Action falls short in its 
usefulness to explain or predict these behaviors.  
As a means of addressing this shortcoming, Ajzen expanded upon the Theory of 
Reasoned Action to create the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1985, 1988, 1991).  Ajzen 
included the Theory of Reasoned Action components of attitude and subjective norm to infer an 
individual’s intention to perform a behavior and added a third component: perceived behavioral 
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control.  This concept of perceived behavioral control has been suggested to be analogous to 
Bandura’s construct of self-efficacy (Ajzen, 1998; Armitage, 2005).  Perceived behavioral 
control is an appraisal process during which individuals examine a specific behavior and all 
factors pertaining to successful execution of that behavior.  By including perceived behavioral 
control with one’s attitude and subjective norms, Ajzen was able to increase accuracy in the 
prediction of behaviors.  
Our control over behavior is moderated by internal and external factors (Ajzen, 1988).  
Internal factors include information, skills, and abilities that allow for successful behavioral 
performance.  Certain behaviors one intends to engage in may require particular attributes 
necessary for successful performance.  Recall our hypothetical participant from earlier.  If we 
asked our participant’s attitude toward running 45 minutes three times a week, our participant 
might list thoughts like, “running is a good way to lose weight” and “losing weight means being 
healthier.”  These beliefs suggest our participant has a positive attitude regarding running.  These 
beliefs may be so strong that our participant may intend to run later today.  This intention may 
not be sufficient as obstacles could stop our participant before our participant even begins.  Our 
participant may not have appropriate running attire or footwear, or could be limited by ailments 
that prohibit running (e.g., too overweight to run, bad knees).   
There are also external factors which moderate control over behavioral performance.  
Factors such as opportunity or dependence on others can influence behavioral performance.  That 
is, a lack or total absence of control over a behavior is to be expected if an opportunity for 
performance never presents itself.  Perhaps our participant intends to lose weight through a 
training regimen; unfortunately, there is no gym nearby with experienced trainers who could help 
maximize our participant’s results.  Our participant might struggle alone for a while but would 
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eventually give up with no noticeable results and no trainer motivating our participant to 
continue. 
The Theory of Planned Behavior is a practical model to predict an individual’s behavior.  
By combining peoples’ attitude with their beliefs of how important others view performance or 
nonperformance of that behavior while taking into account their perception of their own ability 
to control a successful performance, we can theoretically predict one’s intention to perform a 
given behavior.  The Theory of Planned Behavior and its components have been utilized to 
examine sundry behaviors.  Gao and Kosma (2008) investigated mediating effects of Theory of 
Planned Behavior components on future weight training behavior for students enrolled in an 8-
week class.  Consistent with Ajzen’s definition of intention (1991), Gao and Kosma found 
intention to have the most significant effect on students’ weight training behavior.  
In the Netherlands, de Bruijn and Van den Putte (2009) found intention and perceived 
behavioral control correlated with soft drink consumption and television viewing amongst 
adolescent students from several schools.  Perceived behavioral control was the strongest Theory 
of Planned Behavior component to correlate with students’ intention to limit soft drinks and 
television viewing time.  Application of the Theory of Planned Behavior in the area of cancer 
research has provided insight to people’s intentions to engage in various physical and 
psychosocial maintenance behaviors after diagnosis.  Andrykowski and colleagues found Theory 
of Planned Behavior components attitude, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control 
accounted for a “statistically significant and substantial” portion of the variance in behavioral 
intention (Andrykowski, Beacham, Schmidt, & Harper, 2006).    
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Multidimensional Health Locus of Control 
As important as perceived control over behavior per se is, equally important are 
perceptions of whether our outcomes are or are not dependent on that behavior.  In its most basic 
conceptualization, people either believe their outcomes are dependent on their actions or not.  
Rotter (1966) suggested that internal and external control beliefs result from an individual’s 
perception of the source of the majority of control over outcomes: their own behavior (i.e., 
internal) versus some outside influence (i.e., external).  Rotter further claimed these control 
beliefs developed as a learned process in which favorable resolution of a situation brings about a 
desired reinforcement and strengthens one’s expectancy for a similar outcome given a similar 
situation.   
We experience various and sundry situations everyday: matching our outfit appropriately, 
getting to work on time, sinking a 25 foot putt, going for a run.  If people want to go for a run, 
they need simply get off the couch, tie their shoes, and shut the door behind them.  A desired 
reinforcer of this behavior could be a first step toward being healthier, a sense of 
accomplishment, or the flood of endorphins and adrenaline known as “runner’s high.”  Runners 
have control over every aspect of their trip from paths taken, distance they travel, and how long 
they exercise.  Don’t they? 
External forces can influence our plans and potentially reduce our control over outcomes.  
A path one desires to run might be closed because of flooding, roadwork may cause you to 
shorten or extend your intended distance, and unexpected cramps or dangerous weather might 
determine how long you can exercise.  Take a moment to think about your own perceptions 
regarding the three aforementioned situations that could affect your plans.  Do you believe you 
still have control in these instances or could they potentially derail your plans?   
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One with internal control beliefs may presume all above situations could be avoided or 
overcome either through careful attention or problem solving.  One with external control beliefs 
may presume any one of the above situations may hinder or impede intentions to run.  To sum, 
individuals who perceive an outcome of an event as contingent upon their own behavior likely 
have internal control beliefs regarding that outcome.  Individuals who perceive an outcome of an 
event as contingent upon forces outside their own control likely have external control beliefs 
regarding that outcome. 
Building upon Rotter’s theory that there are two loci (i.e., internal and external) of 
control over outcomes, Wallston, Wallston, Kaplan, and Maides (1976) developed the Health 
Locus of Control Scale.  Wallston et al. created an 11-item scale designed to assess the degree to 
which individuals believed their health outcomes were either directly related to their own 
behaviors (i.e., internal) or were due to extraneous and otherwise uncontrollable variables (i.e., 
external).  The higher an individual’s score on this unidimensional measure, the more that 
individual is presumed to have a generalized expectancy that health outcomes are due to chance 
or some other external factor.  In other words, individuals with low scores had more internal 
control beliefs and individuals with high scores had more external control beliefs.  As data was 
collected, a pattern began to emerge and the Health Locus of Control scale was quickly 
revamped in search of more accuracy.  
Levinson (1973) subdivided the external facet of Rotter’s original Internal-External 
concept into chance and powerful others.  By distinguishing beliefs in powerful others from 
beliefs in chance, Levinson was better able to predict and explain people’s behavior.  Within the 
realm of health, it made sense to investigate these same factors as chance and powerful others 
could logically be seen as differentially influencing beliefs regarding health outcomes.  Wallston, 
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Wallston, and DeVellis (1978) revamped the original Health Locus of Control scale to create the 
Multidimensional Health Locus of Control scale.   
Use of the Multidimensional Health Locus of Control scale allows for a clearer picture of 
how individuals perceive their own behavior’s influence over health outcomes.  Questions in the 
Multidimensional Health Locus of Control are designed to glean whether individuals perceive 
health-related outcomes resulting from their own actions (i.e., internal), adherence to the advice 
of health professionals or others (i.e., powerful others), or luck and happenstance (i.e., chance).  
Wallston et al. developed 36 new items creating two forms for the Multidimensional Health 
Locus of Control scale that could be used separately or in conjunction.  In developing this new 
scale, Wallston et al. found scores from the Internal, Powerful Others, and Chance Health Locus 
of Control subscales correlated most significantly with their analogue from Levinson’s scale.  
The Multidimensional Health Locus of Control scale has been validated across numerous 
behaviors (Athale, Aldridge, Malcarne, Nakaji, Samady, & Sadler, 2010; Luszczynska & 
Schwarzer, 2005; Wallston, 2005).  Steptoe and Wardle (2001) investigated effects of health 
locus of control for 10 health related behaviors (e.g., exercise, smoking, alcohol consumption, 
seatbelt use) using data from 7,115 participants across 21 countries.  In their investigation, 
Steptoe and Wardle discovered individuals with higher internal ratings indicated they were more 
likely to exercise, eat breakfast daily, brush their teeth daily, as well as attend to their diet by 
eating fiber, limiting salt, and avoiding fat.  Conversely, it was discovered that individuals with 
higher chance scores were more likely to engage in unhealthy behaviors (e.g., smoking and 
alcohol consumption) and were less likely to attend to their diet by avoiding fruits and fiber with 
little to no attention regarding salt or fat intake.  
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Using a Japanese version adapted from the MHLC scale developed by Wallston et al. 
(1978), researchers in Japan have shown a significant difference across dimensions for treatment 
of lower back pain.  Utilizing a national Japanese sample, Ono and his colleagues found 
individuals willing to try “complementary and alternative medicine” versus western medicine 
alone showed more internality (Ono et al., 2008).  Grotz, Hapke, Lampert, and Baumeister 
(2011) analyzed data from a representative national German Telephone Health Survey and found 
significant health locus of control differences regarding self-reported health behavior.  Grotz and 
her colleagues found individuals with higher internal control scores participated in more 
activities for health-related reasons and consumed alcohol less frequently than did individuals 
with lower internal scores.  Individuals with higher chance control scores participated less in 
sports activities, had fewer dental visits, and were less likely to seek information regarding their 
health.   
These findings seem to support the theoretical assumptions regarding each health locus of 
control dimension: internal health locus of control is associated with positive health behavior, 
chance health locus of control is compatible with negative health behavior, and powerful other 
health locus of control displays no clear association (Grotz et al., 2011; Wallston & Wallston, 
1982; Wallston et al., 1978).  Wallston and Wallston (1982) cautioned however about putting too 
much faith in health control beliefs alone to predict human behavior.  They believed human 
behavior was subject to multiple influences too intricate for health control beliefs to offer much 
predictive validity on their own.  Health control beliefs would seem to be of interest to one 
investigating the potential persuasive effects of thoughts and beliefs regarding health behaviors.  
14 
 
Hypotheses 
Given the aforementioned ideas and findings concerning self-persuasion, the Theory of 
Planned Behavior, and differences in health locus of control, we derived the following 
hypotheses.  First, we hypothesized that increased thought about a health-related behavior will 
not only strengthen people’s attitudes about that behavior but also strengthen subjective norms 
about and perceived control over that behavior.  Second, the effects of increased thought on 
attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived control will be moderated by individual differences in 
locus of control.  For individuals who believe they control their health outcomes, increased 
thought will be associated with increasingly favorable attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived 
control.  For individuals who believe chance controls their health outcomes, increased thought is 
not expected to be associated with increased attitudes, subjective norms, nor perceived 
behavioral control.  (For individuals who believe powerful others control their health outcomes, 
no predictions were made given the aforementioned empirical evidence that beliefs in powerful 
other as a source of outcome control has no consistent relationship to health-related behavior.) 
Method 
Participants 
 A total of 195 students volunteered for a study titled “Individual Differences in 
Perceptions of Health-Related Behaviors.”  Participation in this study was one option available 
for students to earn extra credit in an undergraduate course.  Students who were less than 18 
years of age or had already participated in a related attitude study during the same semester could 
not participate in this study. 
 Researchers collected data from 145 female and 50 male participants utilizing the 
software program MediaLab.  As sex is not confounded with self-generated attitude change or 
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our health behavior of interest (i.e., getting 8 hours of sleep a night), an equal ratio of females to 
males was unnecessary.  Of these participants, 68% were Caucasian, with the remainder 
indicating their race as African-American, Latino, Pacific Islander, or Other.  Most participants 
(64%) were 18-22 years-of-age.  
 Experimental conditions were randomized for each timeslot prior to being made available 
to participants.  Researchers obtained a signed informed consent document from every 
participant before proceeding further with this study.  Data for six participants were removed due 
to computer malfunction, school alarms, or prior participation.  All participants were treated in 
accordance with the Ethical Principals of Psychologists and Code of Conduct (American 
Psychological Association, 2010). 
Procedure and Materials 
One of two researchers (one male or one female) greeted participants as they arrived at a 
designated lab.  A maximum of four participants could enroll in each session that was conducted 
by only one researcher.  To begin, we informed participants of the purpose of this study.  We 
explained that while being healthy was generally accepted as important, discussion continued as 
to what behaviors were “best suited” for becoming and staying healthy.  To ascertain what 
participants considered important, they were told they would be presented questions regarding 
specific health behaviors and health in general.  Participants were informed that included in this 
study were questions about themselves to investigate any influence individual differences may 
have on beliefs toward health.  At this point, we asked participants if they had any questions 
regarding this study.   
 A researcher handed each participant an informed consent document to read and sign.  
We reminded participants that continuing with this study was voluntary, responses would remain 
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confidential, and withdrawal from this study was allowable at anytime without penalty.  A 
researcher answered any questions participants asked.  Once all questions, if any, were answered, 
we collected the informed consent documents and initiated this study on a computer located in 
front of each participant.  Participants completed the remainder of this study using the software 
program MediaLab. 
 On a screen in front of them, participants read instructions to indicate their attitude 
toward several health-related behaviors using a provided scale.  A 3-point scale was provided 
allowing participants to indicate whether they considered a given behavior to be (a) beneficial, 
(b) neither beneficial nor detrimental, or (c) detrimental.  Participants viewed eight health-
related behaviors randomly presented one at a time (i.e., getting 8 hours of sleep, 
sending/receiving text messages while driving).  After indicating their attitudes toward all eight 
behaviors, participants continued to this study’s next phase.   
 On the screen in front of them participants read instructions regarding the next phase of 
this study.  All participants were presented with the health-related behavior getting 8 hours of 
sleep a night and asked to focus on their beliefs regarding this behavior.  Participants read this 
was a timed exercise and that they should continue to think about and list all beliefs until 
prompted by their computer to stop.  We used two experimental conditions for this study, a high 
(i.e., 240 seconds) and low (i.e., 120 seconds) thought opportunity, which a researcher 
randomized prior to allowing participants to volunteer.  We instructed participants to use their 
allotted time to think about and list their beliefs regarding the behavior getting 8 hours of sleep a 
night.  We suggested participants also think about what friends or family members might think 
about getting 8 hours of sleep a night as well as participants’ own abilities to engage in this 
behavior. 
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 Once participants’ thought opportunity had expired, they read instructions regarding a 
series of questions pertaining to specific beliefs they had regarding the behavior getting 8 hours 
of sleep.  These 18 questions were adapted from components of Icek Ajzen’s Theory of Planned 
Behavior (1988, 1991, 2006).  Ajzen (2006) provides instructions for developing items to assess 
the different components in his Theory of Planned Behavior: attitude, perceived norms, 
intention, and perceived behavioral control.  From these instructions, we created 18 items.   
 To assess participants’ attitudes, we included six items such as “For me to get at least 8 
hours of sleep each night in the forthcoming month is valuable/worthless.”  To assess 
participants’ subjective norms, we included six items such as “Many people like me get at least 8 
hours of sleep each night extremely likely/extremely unlikely.”  To assess participants’ behavioral 
intention, we included three items such as “I intend to get at least 8 hours of sleep each night in 
the forthcoming month extremely likely/extremely unlikely.”  To assess participants’ perceived 
behavioral control, we included three items such as “It is mostly up to me whether or not I get at 
least 8 hours of sleep each night in the forthcoming month strongly agree/strongly disagree.”  
Participants were asked to indicate their reactions to these statements using a 7-point scale. 
 Numerous studies have been conducted using the Theory of Planned Behavior allowing 
repeated observation of the reliability and validity of measures derived from this theory.  In their 
investigation of the potential mediation effects of the Theory of Planned Behavior, Armitage et 
al. (2002) found favorable internal reliability for scores for measures of all theoretical constructs.  
Cronbach’s alphas ranged from 0.62 (e.g., subjective norms) to 0.95 (e.g., behavioral intention 
and perceived behavioral control).  In our study, internal reliability for Theory of Planned 
Behavior constructs was consistent with past research.  Cronbach’s alphas for behavioral attitude 
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( = .78), perceived norms ( = .68), perceived behavioral control ( = .83), and behavioral 
intentions ( = .82) were all within range of previous studies.   
 There is evidence of construct validity for components of the Theory of Planned 
Behavior.  Armitage and Conner (2001) investigated 161 separate journal articles that included 
185 separate empirical tests of measures derived from the Theory of Planned Behavior.  When 
weighted for sample size, the average multiple correlation found of attitude, subjective norm, and 
perceived behavioral control with intention was R = .63 and accounted for 39% of the observed 
variance.  Individually each of the TPB components still maintained medium correlations with 
behavioral intention.  Attitudes had the highest observed correlation (r = .49) and subjective 
norm had the lowest (r = .34).  Perceived behavioral control was also found to have a moderate 
correlation (r = .43) and when controlling for attitude and subjective norm still accounted for 6% 
of the total variance (also see Albarracín, Johnson, Fishbein, & Muellerleile, 2001; Godin & Kok 
1996). 
 Next, participants completed Form A of the Multidimensional Health Locus of Control 
Scale (Wallston et al., 1978).  The Multidimensional Health Locus of Control Scale (MHLC) 
was used to assess whether individuals believed their health outcomes were controlled by 
themselves or by external influences.  Participants were instructed to indicate their agreement 
with each item using a 6-point Likert scale with endpoints “strongly agree” (1) and “strongly 
disagree” (6).  Participants read items in the same order suggested by Wallston et al. (1978). 
 This scale is comprised of three subscales consisting of six questions each.  Items for the 
Internal Health Locus of Control subscale are designed to establish the extent to which 
individuals believe their health outcomes are dependent on their own behavior (e.g., “The main 
thing which affects my health is what I myself do”).  Items for the Powerful Others Health Locus 
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of Control subscale are designed to determine the extent to which individuals believe powerful 
others (i.e., parents, health care professionals) control their health outcomes (e.g., “Regarding my 
health, I can only do what my doctor tells me to do”).  Items for the Chance Health Locus of 
Control subscale are designed to ascertain the extent to which individuals believe chance (i.e., 
luck) controls their health outcomes (e.g., “No matter what I do, if I am going to get sick, I will 
get sick”).   
 Scores from responses were summed separately to create a total score for each subscale.  
Each subscale score could range from 6 to 36.  To classify participants, we used median splits of 
the full range of scores on each subscale.  To clarify, an individual with a score above 15 on the 
internal locus of control subscale was classified as having a strong beliefs that their health 
outcomes are dependent on their own behavior, whereas an individual with a score below 14 was 
classified as having a weak beliefs that their health outcomes are dependent on their own 
behavior.  This median split procedure was similar for scores on both the Powerful Others (mdn 
= 15) and Chance (mdn = 15) subscales.   
 In development of their Multidimensional Health Locus of Control Scale, Wallston et al. 
(1978) found internal consistency for scores form all three Form A subscales.  Cronbach’s alphas 
for items in this initial sample were .76 (Internal), .67 (Powerful Others), and .75 (Chance).  
More recently, Masters and Wallston (2005) have found internal consistency coefficients for 
each subscale: .68 (Internal), .65 (Powerful Others), and .56 (Chance).  In this study, we found 
congruent internal consistency coefficients:  = .73 (Internal), .61 (Powerful Others), and .58 
(Chance). 
 Convergent validity for the Multidimensional Health Locus of Control scale has been 
observed with the combined forms of each subscale correlating most highly with its theoretical 
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counterpart from Levinson’s Internal, Powerful Others, and Chance locus of control scales 
(Wallston et al., 1978): Internal MHLC scale and I Scale (r = .56, p < .001), Powerful Others 
MHLC scale and P Scale (r = .27, p < .01), and Chance MHLC scale and C Scale (r = .77, p < 
.001).   Although Wallston et al. observed no significant correlations with sex, Form A of the 
Powerful Others scale was found to correlate significantly with both age (r = .19, p < .05) and 
education level (r = -.22, p < .05).  Health status of participants was also found to correlate 
positively with scores on Internal MHLC (r = .40, p < .001), negatively with scores on Chance 
MHLC (r = -.27, p < .01) but not with scores on Powerful Others.  
 Upon completion of all study measures, participants then answered several basic 
demographic questions.  We asked participants to indicate their sex with response options Male 
or Female.  We asked participants to indicate their age with response options 18-22, 23-27, 28-
32, 33-37, or 38 or more.  Finally, we asked participants to indicate their ethnicity with response 
options African-American, Asian/ Pacific Islander, Caucasian, Hispanic, or Other. Additionally, 
three questions were posed to assess the amount of sleep each participant received (a) the night 
before the study, (b) on a typical weeknight, and (c) on a typical weekend night.  Participants 
indicated the number of hours they slept using the response options Less than 6, 7, 8, 9, or 10 or 
more.  After completing this study, we escorted participants out of the lab space and asked if 
they had any questions.   
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
 In this study, we measured participants’ health locus of control beliefs using the 
Multidimensional Health Locus of Control scale (Wallston et al., 1978).  The Multidimensional 
Health Locus of Control scale consists of three subscales: Internal, Powerful Others, and Chance.  
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Because locus of control beliefs are measured and not manipulated, it is possible scores on these 
three subscales may be confounded.  To determine if there was multicollinearity among these 
three measures, we correlated the full range of scores across the three subscales.   
 No correlation was found between scores on the Internal subscale (the extent to which 
individuals believe they control their health outcomes) and scores on Powerful Others subscale 
(the extent in which individuals believe health outcomes are controlled by powerful others), r = 
.03, p = .639. No correlation was found between scores on the Powerful Others subscale and 
scores on the Chance subscale (the extent to which individuals believe health outcomes are 
controlled by chance), r = .07, p = .278.  There was, however, a reliable but small correlation 
between scores on the Internal subscale and the Chance subscale, r = -0.29, p < .001.   
 As suggested by Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003), the squared value of a 
correlation between two variables is an appropriate index of multicollinearity.  The squared value 
of the correlation between scores on the Internal subscale and scores on the Chance subscale is 
.09.  With the amount of shared variance between the Internal and Chance subscales only 
reaching 9%, this correlation was treated as insignificant.  Given that there is no evidence of 
multicollinearity in our sample, we treated scores on the three subscales of Multidimensional 
Health Locus of Control as independent predictors in our analyses. 
Overview of Design and Analysis  
 In this study, we utilized a 2 (high opportunity for thought vs. low opportunity for 
thought) by 2 (high MHLC dimension vs. low MHLC dimension) factorial design.  Both thought 
opportunity and Multidimensional Health Locus of Control dimension were between-subject 
factors.  Dependant variables of interest are attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral 
control pertaining to the health behavior of interest for this study (i.e., getting 8 hours of sleep a 
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night).  We analyzed these dependant variables in a series of 2 x 2 ANOVAs.  In these 
ANOVAs, we analyzed different individual difference measures and different dependant 
variables. 
 We expected individuals provided with more time to think will have more polarized 
attitudes, perceived norms, and perceived behavioral control than will individuals provided with 
less time to think.  That is, we hypothesized a main effect of thought opportunity on self-
generated changes in attitude, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control.  It was also 
hypothesized that individual differences in locus of control beliefs (i.e., Internal, Powerful 
Others, Chance) will moderate the effects of thought on attitudes, perceived norms, and 
perceived behavioral control.  In other words, for each of the dependant variables (attitudes, 
perceived norms, perceived behavioral control), we are expecting an interactive effect of thought 
opportunity and individual differences in locus of control beliefs. 
Main Analyses 
 Internal Locus of Control Beliefs. We first analyzed participants’ attitudes regarding 
getting 8 hours of sleep a night.  Contrary to our hypotheses, there was neither a main effect of 
thought opportunity nor an interactive effect of thought opportunity with internal locus of control 
beliefs on behavioral attitudes, all Fs < 1.00.  There was however an unanticipated main effect of 
internal locus of control beliefs on behavioral attitudes, F(1,191) = 6.50, p = .012.  Participants 
had increasingly favorable attitudes about getting 8 hours of sleep a night if they had an internal 
locus of control (M = 37.59, SD = 4.38) than if they had an external locus of control (M = 35.68, 
SD = 5.90).  
 We next analyzed participants’ perceived norms regarding our behavior of interest.  We 
found neither a main effect of thought opportunity nor an interactive effect of thought 
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opportunity with internal locus of control beliefs and perceived behavioral norms, all Fs < 1.00.  
The previously unanticipated main effect of internal control beliefs on our dependant variable of 
interest was observed again, F(1, 191) = 8.99, p = .003.  Participants’ had increasingly favorable 
perceived behavioral norms if they had an internal locus of control (M = 29.74, SD = 5.99) than 
if they had an external locus of control (M = 27.35, SD = 5.05). 
 Finally we analyzed participants’ perceived behavioral control.  We again found neither a 
main effect of thought opportunity nor an interactive effect of thought opportunity with internal 
locus of control beliefs on perceived behavioral control, all Fs < 1.54.  However, there was a 
marginal main effect of internal control beliefs on participants’ perceived control of getting 8 
hours of sleep per night, F(1, 191) = 2.25, p = .135.  Mean scores for perceived behavioral 
control were higher for individuals with strong internal control beliefs (M = 15.10, SD = 4.69) 
than for individuals with weak internal control beliefs (M = 14.20, SD = 4.92).  Although this 
trend was not significant at conventional levels of statistical significance, it is worth noting. 
 Powerful Others Locus of Control Beliefs.  As before, we first analyzed participants’ 
attitudes toward getting 8 hours of sleep a night.  We found neither a main effect for thought 
opportunity nor a main effect for beliefs in powerful others on behavioral attitudes, all Fs < 1.00.  
Additionally, there was no interactive effect of thought opportunity with beliefs in powerful 
others on behavioral attitudes, F < 1.00.   
Analyzing participants’ perceived norms toward our behavior of interest, we found no main 
effect for thought opportunity, F < 1.00.  There was however a main effect for beliefs in 
powerful others on perceived norms, F(1, 191) = 4.78, p = .030.  Participants had more favorable 
perceived norms regarding getting 8 hours of sleep a night if they had stronger beliefs in 
powerful others (M = 29.38, SD = 5.38) than if they had weaker beliefs in powerful others (M = 
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27.58, SD = 5.81).  There was also an interactive effect of thought opportunity and beliefs in 
powerful others regarding perceived norms, F(1, 191) = 3.97, p = .048.  Participants provided 
with a low thought opportunity had more favorable perceived behavioral norms if they had 
stronger beliefs in powerful others (M = 30.17, SD = 5.52) than if they had weaker beliefs in 
powerful others (M = 26.83, SD = 5.68).  This difference was not observed for participants 
provided with a high thought opportunity: stronger beliefs in powerful others (M = 28.54, SD = 
5.16) and weaker beliefs in powerful others (M = 28.39, SD = 5.91). 
Finally, we analyzed perceived behavioral control.  Although there was no interactive 
effect between thought opportunity and beliefs in powerful others on perceived control, F < 1.00, 
there was a trend in the data toward a main effect of thought opportunity, F(1, 191) = 1.84, p = 
.178.  Participants perceived themselves as having more control over the behavior in the low 
thought opportunity condition (M = 15.09, SD = 4.69) than in the high thought opportunity 
condition (M = 14.16, SD = 4.92).  There was also a main effect of beliefs in powerful others on 
perceived behavioral control, F(1, 191) = 5.10, p = .025.  Interestingly, participants with stronger 
beliefs in powerful others perceived themselves as having more control over getting 8 hours of 
sleep a night (M = 15.38, SD = 4.42) than did participants with weaker beliefs in powerful others 
(M = 13.83, SD = 5.12). 
Chance Locus of Control Beliefs.  The results involving the relationship between beliefs 
in chance either alone or in combination with thought opportunity can be summarized succinctly.  
For all three dependent variables (i.e., attitudes, perceived norms, and perceived behavioral 
control), there was neither main effects of thought opportunity nor beliefs in chance nor 
interactive effects between these two variables, all Fs ≤ 1.87 and all ps ≥ .173.   
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Exploratory Analyses 
Moderating Effects of Thought Opportunity.  Recall that according to Ajzen and 
Fishbein, intention to engage in performance of a specific behavior is best determined by 
understanding an individual’s attitude, perceived norms, and perceived control regarding a 
specific behavior.  Although we expected thought opportunity to influence people’s attitude, 
perceived norms, and perceived behavioral control, it is possible that thought operates to 
moderate the connection between these variables and behavioral intentions.  To explore this 
possibility, we conducted a series of multiple regression analyses (one for each of the three 
predictive components in the Theory of Planned Behavior).  In these analyses, thought 
opportunity was a categorical predictor variable and attitudes, perceived norms, and perceived 
behavioral control were continuous predictor variables.  Our dependent variable was 
participants’ intentions to get 8 hours of sleep a night.  
We found a main effect of attitude about the behavior on behavioral intentions, F(1, 191) 
= 121.82, p < .001.  The more favorable participants attitudes were about getting 8 hours of sleep 
a night, the more they said they intended to engage in that behavior, r = .64, p < .001.  However, 
there was no main effect of thought opportunity nor did thought opportunity moderate the effect 
of attitudes on behavioral intentions, both Fs < 1.00.   
This pattern was repeated when subjective norms were regressed onto behavioral intentions.  We 
found a main effect of subjective norms on behavioral intentions, F(1, 191) = 84.31, p < .001.  
Participants with more favorable subjective norms intended to engage in the behavior more than 
did individuals with less favorable subjective norms, r = .56, p <.001.  Again, we found neither a 
main effect of thought opportunity nor a moderation of the effects of subjective norms on 
behavioral intentions, both Fs < 1.00.   
26 
 
Analyzing perceived control, we found the same story.  There was an main effect of 
perceived control on behavioral intentions, F(1, 191) = 79.18, p < .001.  Participants who 
perceived themselves as having more control over the behavior were more likely to say they 
intended to engage the behavior, r = .54, p < .001.  Again neither a main effect nor an interactive 
effect of thought opportunity with perceived behavioral control occurred for behavioral 
intentions, both Fs < 1.00.   
 Moderating Effects of Locus of Control Beliefs.  It is also possible that individual 
differences in health locus of control beliefs moderate the connection between attitudes, 
perceived norms, and perceived control and behavioral intentions.  To explore this possibility, 
we conducted a series of multiple regression analyses (one for each of the types of locus of 
control beliefs in the Multidimensional Health Locus of Control Scale). 
.  In these analyses, locus of control beliefs were a categorical predictor variable and attitudes, 
perceived norms, and perceived control toward getting 8 hours of sleep a night were continuous 
predictor variables.  Our dependent variable was intentions to engage in getting 8 hours of sleep 
a night.   
When investigating individuals’ beliefs that their health outcomes are dependent on their 
own behavior, we again found a main effect of individuals’ attitude toward getting 8 hours of 
sleep a night, F(1, 191) = 158.83, p < .001, and we also found a main effect of individuals’ 
beliefs that their health outcomes are dependent on their own behavior, F(1, 191) = 20.33, p < 
.001.  The more participants believed that getting 8 hours of sleep a night was something that 
was contingent on their own actions, the more they said they intended to engage in that behavior, 
r = .13, p = .067.  There was also an observed interaction between individuals’ belief that their 
health outcomes are dependent on their own behavior and behavioral attitudes on behavioral 
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intentions, F(1, 191) = 21.08, p < .001.  For participants with relatively weak beliefs that their 
health outcomes depend on their own behavior, there was a positive correlation between their 
attitudes about the behavior and their intentions to engage in the behavior, r = .53, p < .001.  For 
participants with relatively strong beliefs that their health outcomes depend on their own 
behavior, there was an even stronger positive correlation between their attitudes about the 
behavior and their intentions to engage in the behavior, r = .78, p < .001.  Given the main effect 
and interactive effect previously mentioned, a belief that one’s health outcomes are contingent on 
one’s own behavior has a direct as well as an indirect effect on behavioral intentions about 
getting 8 hours of sleep a night.   
Those same beliefs that health outcomes are dependent on their own behavior, however, 
did not moderate the effects of norms and perceived behavioral control on participants’ 
behavioral intentions.  We again observed main effects for norms, F(1, 191) = 77.25, p < .001, 
and perceived controllability, F(1, 191) = 76.49, p < .001, on behavioral intentions.  However, 
the main effect of beliefs that their health outcome are dependent on their own behavior and 
interaction effects of those beliefs with perceived norms or perceived controllability regarding 
getting 8 hours of sleep a night were non-significant, all Fs <1.00. 
 When investigating people’s beliefs in powerful others, we found the aforementioned main 
effect of individuals’ attitude toward getting 8 hours of sleep a night, F(1, 191) = 144.04, p < 
.001, and we also found a main effect of beliefs in powerful others, F(1, 191) = 6.83, p < .009.  
The more participants perceived that getting 8 hours of sleep a night was controlled by powerful 
others, the more they said they intended to engage in that behavior, r = .20, p = .006.  There was 
also an interaction between individuals’ beliefs in powerful others and behavioral attitudes on 
behavioral intentions, F(1, 191) = 4.61, p < .033.  For participants with relatively strong beliefs 
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that their health outcomes depend on powerful others, there was a positive correlation between 
their attitudes about the behavior and their intentions to engage in the behavior, r = .61, p < .001.  
For participants with relatively weak beliefs that their health outcomes depended on powerful 
others, there was an even stronger positive correlation between their attitudes about the behavior 
and their intentions to engage in the behavior, r = .70, p < .001.  Given the main effect as well as 
interactive effect previously mentioned, a belief in powerful others ability to control their own 
health outcomes has a direct as well as an indirect effect on behavioral intentions about getting 8 
hours of sleep a night.   
Those beliefs in powerful others, however, did not moderate the effects of norms and 
perceived behavioral control on participants’ behavioral intentions.  We again observed main 
effects for norms, F(1, 191) = 80.09, p < .001, and perceived controllability, F(1, 191) = 75.53, p 
< .001, on behavioral intentions.  However, the main effect of beliefs in powerful others and 
interaction effects of those beliefs with perceived norms or perceived controllability regarding 
getting 8 hours of sleep a night were non-significant, all Fs <1.00. 
The results involving the relationship between beliefs in chance and (a) attitudes, (b) subjective 
norms, and (c) perceived control with peoples’ intentions to get 8 hours of sleep a night can be 
summarized succinctly.  As before, we found main effects for attitudes, F(1, 191) = 130.66, p 
<.001, perceived norms, F(1, 191) = 87.48, p < .001, and perceived control, F(1, 191) = 80.87, p 
< .001, on people’s behavioral intention.  There was, however, neither a main effect of beliefs in 
chance nor interactive effects of beliefs in chance with any predictor variable (i.e., attitudes, 
perceived norms, and perceived behavioral control), all Fs < 2.09 and all ps > .15. 
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Discussion 
 In this study, we investigated people’s self-generated changes in attitude, subjective 
norms, and perceived control regarding health-related behaviors.  Because the vast majority of 
our participants had initially favorable attitudes about getting 8 hours of sleep, our original 
hypotheses were altered such that we hypothesized that individuals would tend to show more 
favorable attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control as thought opportunity 
increased.  We also hypothesized that the self-persuasion experienced would be moderated by 
individual differences in locus of control beliefs.  This is to say that with more time to think, 
participants would tend to show more favorable attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived 
behavioral control regarding our health behavior of interest.  Likewise, these thought-induced 
changes in attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived control would increase in favorability as a 
function of peoples’ health locus of control beliefs, with those who believe health outcomes are 
dependent on their own behavior showing the greatest increase and those who believe health 
outcomes are dependent on chance showing the least increase.  Support was found for some, but 
not all, of these hypotheses.  
 Overall, we did not find an effect of thought opportunity on peoples’ attitudes, subjective 
norms, and perceived control regarding the behavior getting 8 hours of sleep a night.  Although 
not hypothesized, we examined the possibility that perhaps thought does not function to 
strengthen attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control, but instead functions to 
moderate the influence of each of those variables on behavioral intentions.  Here again, we found 
no effects of thought opportunity with attitudes, subjective norms, or perceived control.  The 
exception to this was observed regarding individuals who believe health outcomes are dependent 
on powerful others.  For perceived behavioral control, we did in fact find the expected effects of 
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thought as well as an unexpected moderating effect of belief in powerful others.  In the low 
thought opportunity, participants with strong beliefs in powerful others were found to have 
significantly more favorable perceived norms regarding getting 8 hours of sleep a night than 
participants with weak beliefs in powerful others.  This significant difference was not observed 
in the high thought opportunity.  
 Although we did not find evidence to support the mere thought phenomenon, we were, 
however, able to replicate many findings of previous Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991; 
2006; Armitage, 2005) and Multidimensional Health Locus of Control studies (Grotz et al., 
2011; Steptoe & Wardle, 2001).  We found robust effects of attitudes, subjective norms, and 
perceived behavioral control on participants’ intentions to get 8 hours of sleep a night.  In accord 
with previous research, the more favorable participants’ attitudes, subjective norms, and 
perceived control toward getting 8 hours of sleep a night, the more they said they intended to 
engage in that behavior.  Also, we found direct and indirect effects of internal and powerful other 
control beliefs on behavioral intentions to get 8 hours of sleep a night.  Participants with strong 
internal or powerful other control beliefs had stronger behavioral intentions than did participants 
with weak internal or powerful other control beliefs.  These control beliefs were also found to 
interact with participants’ attitudes to affect behavioral intention. That is, the connection between 
behavioral attitudes and behavioral intentions became stronger as the belief that powerful others 
controlled participants’ health outcomes became weaker. 
Potential Limitations and Alternative Explanations 
 The paucity of results regarding the mere thought effect on attitudes, subjective norms, 
and perceived behavioral control is somewhat surprising.  This mere thought effect is well 
documented and robust for numerous attitude objects (Tesser, 1978; Tesser et al., 1995). 
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However, there is evidence to suggest that this relationship of thought opportunity with attitude 
polarization might not be a strictly linear one.  Clarkson et al. (2011) found evidence that too 
little or too much thought can serve to undermine attitude polarization.  Numerous thought 
opportunities have been used throughout the self-persuasion literature.  Clarkson et al. suggest 
the perception of time passed is more important to attitude polarization than actual time passed.  
If participants perceive insufficient time to access their beliefs, these individuals may not be able 
to organize their beliefs which would thereby hinder polarization.  Likewise, if participants 
perceive too much time having passed, these individuals may not be able to generate any more 
beliefs which would thereby undermine their confidence in their attitudes. 
 For example, researchers have recently discovered that an important factor for attitude 
polarization is thought confidence (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Petty, Bri ol, &  
Tormala, 2002).  Regardless of initial attitude direction (i.e., positive or negative), as confidence 
in thoughts increases, so too does attitude strength.  However, too much time to think can cause 
“thought exhaustion” undermining thought confidence and, as a result, attitude polarization 
(Clarkson, et al. 2011).  Much like participants who feel they don’t have enough time to express 
their thoughts, individuals who perceive too much time to think reach a point of “thought 
exhaustion.”  Once this threshold is reached, participants may begin to have trouble generating 
attitude consistent thoughts.  This inability to generate new thoughts could undermine confidence 
in previously listed thoughts causing attitude attenuation (i.e., weakening).  
 One definite limitation for this study is the measurement, not manipulation, of 
participants’ attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control as well as locus of 
control beliefs.  As a result, we are unable to make causal inferences based on any correlational 
relationship found for these variables and behavioral intention.  There are two potential problems 
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in this study: directionality and third variables (Aronson, Wilson, & Brewer, 1998).  The 
directionality problem concerns the inability to determine which variable is a cause and which 
variable is an effect based on a correlation alone (Aronson et al., 1998).  We cannot determine if 
favorable attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived control affect peoples’ intentions to engage 
in a behavior, or if because people intend to engage in a behavior, they have favorable attitudes, 
subjective norms, and perceived control.  Our ability to make cause and effect inferences are also 
hampered by the third variable problem: the possibility of another variable explaining our 
findings. Locus of control beliefs pertain to what brings about a desired reinforcer: self, powerful 
others, or chance.  All else being equal, people faced with a choice between two contradictory 
goals should favor the goal they value most.  If scores on a health values measure were found to 
correlate with beliefs about the control of health outcomes and behavioral intentions, any 
obtained relationship between health locus of control beliefs and behavioral intentions could be 
spurious.  Therefore, the possibility exists that had we measured and controlled additional 
variables, we would have observed different relationships between intentions and attitudes, 
norms, and perceived behavioral control as well as locus of control beliefs. 
 Another potential limitation to this study is the use of a self-report method.  Although 
self-report allows for quick and easy data collection, there are several disadvantages.  Self-report 
is only an indicator of peoples’ explicit attitudes regarding attitude objects.  Explicit attitudes are 
deliberate and under conscious control making them susceptible to various favorable self-
presentation techniques (Krosnick, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2005; Paulhus & Vazire, 2007).  Each 
participant responded anonymously to all study related items, which we hoped would reduce the 
impact of socially desirable responding.  However, participants may still engage in self-
deception.  As a result of this self-deception, participants might have answered items in such a 
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way to allow them to maintain their favorable self-impressions (Krosnick et al., 2005; Paulhus & 
Vazire, 2007).  By supplementing self-report with unobtrusive behavioral observations and/or 
psychophysiological measures, we could access individuals’ implicit attitudes (i.e., attitudes not 
under conscious control) thereby potentially removing the confounding effects of self-
presentation biases (Bassili & Brown, 2005; Krosnick et al., 2005).   
Future Directions 
 In an attempt to rectify some of the limitations of this study, it might be prudent to first 
address the health behavior of interest.  In this study, the health behavior of interest was getting 
eight hours of sleep a night.  Although this behavior was one that could easily be performed by 
all participants, we found it was also one for which there was little initial attitudinal variability.  
An overwhelming majority of participants believed sleep to be a favorable behavior which may 
have limited our ability to find self-persuasion effects.  There are other behaviors that have more 
attitudinal variability.  The use of artificial sweeteners has come under scrutiny lately. There 
have been claims of harmful side effects resulting from ingestion such as headaches and 
gastrointestinal issues.  Likewise, there is much new information about the potential uses of 
marijuana to alleviate various ailments without risk of serious side effects.  It is likely there are 
opposing points of view on this matter.  Using behaviors with more attitude variability increases 
the potential of more participants having a moderate attitude toward the behavior of interest.  
Attitude objects with more variability would remove the effects of stronger attitudes preventing 
attitude change.     
 A second limitation needing attention involves the thought opportunity used in this study.  
By reducing the amount of time for both thought opportunities, researchers can limit the 
possibility that participants will become “bored” while engaged in thought, potentially 
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undermining their confidence and, by extension, self-persuasion.  This change, in combination 
with a health behavior for which people have more variable attitudes, should improve the 
possibility of detecting mere thought effects on attitudes toward health-related behaviors as well 
as perceived norms and perceived control over those behaviors.   
 Another future direction would be the inclusion of other potential mediators and 
moderators.  Thought confidence, habit strength, and health values all have potential to influence 
variables in this study.  Thought confidence has been shown to be related to attitude polarization 
and can offer more information regarding the impact of thoughts people have (see Bri ol & 
Petty, 2009).  Eagly and Chaiken (1993) have suggested that past behavior could influence future 
behavior as a result of factors that are stable over time.  One of these stable factors could be habit 
strength which has been shown to affect behavior and intentions (de Bruijn, Kremers, de Vet, de 
Nooijer, van Mechelen, & Brug, 2007; Verplanken, 2006).  Likewise, the value people place on 
their health can influence the thoughts and perceptions they have toward health and health 
behaviors.  Among middle-aged men, higher health values scores have been shown to not only 
increase the likelihood of positive change regarding health behaviors but also decrease the 
likelihood of negative change (Shi, Nakamura, & Takano, 2004).  Therefore, it makes sense to 
include these variables in future studies investigating the confluence of self-persuasion, the 
Theory of Planned Behavior, and health locus of control beliefs on health-related behaviors.   
 Concluding Remarks.  The potential utility in understanding how individual differences 
in control beliefs affect attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived control regarding health 
behaviors could be demonstrated in numerous ways.  First, by better understanding the source of 
peoples’ perceived control over their health, intervention methods can be focused on internal, 
powerful others, or chance control beliefs to effect the most change.  Second, health information 
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could be presented illustrating favorable attitude, subjective norms, and controllability thereby 
potentially making these instances more salient and easily recallable.  These and other techniques 
may begin to maximize the impact of the barrage of health information to which we are all 
exposed on a daily basis.  With a better understanding how this health information can influence 
attitudes, norms, and perceptions of control as a function of locus of control beliefs, we can 
implement interventions that promote a healthier population.   
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